ADOAuditLogs
| where OperationName =~ "AuditLog.StreamDisabledByUser"
| extend StreamType = tostring(Data.ConsumerType)
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Details, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, StreamType
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])
relevantTechniques:
- T1562.008
name: Azure DevOps Audit Stream Disabled
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
severity: High
id: 4e8238bd-ff4f-4126-a9f6-09b3b6801b3d
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors: []
kind: Scheduled
query: |
ADOAuditLogs
| where OperationName =~ "AuditLog.StreamDisabledByUser"
| extend StreamType = tostring(Data.ConsumerType)
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Details, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, StreamType
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])
description: |
'Azure DevOps allow for audit logs to be streamed to external storage solutions such as SIEM solutions. An attacker looking to hide malicious Azure DevOps activity from defenders may look to disable data streams before conducting activity and then re-enabling the stream after (so as not to raise data threshold-based alarms). Looking for disabled audit streams can identify this activity, and due to the nature of the action its unlikely to have a high false positive rate.'
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/AzureDevOpsAuditing/Analytic Rules/ADOAuditStreamDisabled.yaml
triggerOperator: gt
queryPeriod: 1d
queryFrequency: 1d
version: 1.0.5
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: ActorUPN
identifier: FullName
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: IpAddress
identifier: Address