Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call

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Id	2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090
Rulename	Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call
Description	This query dynamically identifies Exchange servers and then looks for instances where the IIS worker process initiates a call out to a remote URL using either cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This behaviour was described as post-compromise behaviour following exploitation of CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, this pattern of activity was use to download additional tools to the server. This suspicious activity is generic.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Execution
Techniques	T1059.001 T1059.003
Required data connectors	AzureMonitor(IIS) MicrosoftThreatProtection
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ExchangeWorkerProcessMakingRemoteCall.yaml
Version	1.1.2
Arm template	2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090.json

KQL

let suspiciousCmdLineKeywords = dynamic(["http://", "https://"]);
// Identify exchange servers based on known paths
// Summarize these to get a list of exchange server hostnames
let exchangeServers = W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any("/owa/","/ews/","/ecp/","/autodiscover/")
// Only where successful, rule out failed scanning
| where scStatus startswith "2"
| summarize by Computer;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceName in~ (exchangeServers)
// Where the IIS worker process initiated CMD or PowerShell
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == "w3wp.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")
// Where CMD or PowerShell command line included parameters associated with CVE-2022-41040/CVE-2022-41082 exploitation
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any(suspiciousCmdLineKeywords)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName
| extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)

YAML

severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1059.001
- T1059.003
queryFrequency: 1d
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.1.2
metadata:
  support:
    tier: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Application
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Community
  source:
    kind: Community
triggerOperator: gt
description: |
  'This query dynamically identifies Exchange servers and then looks for instances where the IIS worker process initiates a call out to a remote URL using either cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
  This behaviour was described as post-compromise behaviour following exploitation of CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, this pattern of activity was use to download additional tools to the server. This suspicious activity is generic.'  
queryPeriod: 1d
id: 2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Account
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DeviceName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: HostNameDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
tactics:
- Execution
name: Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call
triggerThreshold: 0
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ExchangeWorkerProcessMakingRemoteCall.yaml
query: |
  let suspiciousCmdLineKeywords = dynamic(["http://", "https://"]);
  // Identify exchange servers based on known paths
  // Summarize these to get a list of exchange server hostnames
  let exchangeServers = W3CIISLog
  | where csUriStem has_any("/owa/","/ews/","/ecp/","/autodiscover/")
  // Only where successful, rule out failed scanning
  | where scStatus startswith "2"
  | summarize by Computer;
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where DeviceName in~ (exchangeServers)
  // Where the IIS worker process initiated CMD or PowerShell
  | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == "w3wp.exe"
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")
  // Where CMD or PowerShell command line included parameters associated with CVE-2022-41040/CVE-2022-41082 exploitation
  | where ProcessCommandLine has_any(suspiciousCmdLineKeywords)
  | project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName
  | extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)  
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - W3CIISLog
  connectorId: AzureMonitor(IIS)
- dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
  connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query dynamically identifies Exchange servers and then looks for instances where the IIS worker process initiates a call out to a remote URL using either cmd.exe or powershell.exe.\nThis behaviour was described as post-compromise behaviour following exploitation of CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, this pattern of activity was use to download additional tools to the server. This suspicious activity is generic.'\n",
        "displayName": "Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Account",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ExchangeWorkerProcessMakingRemoteCall.yaml",
        "query": "let suspiciousCmdLineKeywords = dynamic([\"http://\", \"https://\"]);\n// Identify exchange servers based on known paths\n// Summarize these to get a list of exchange server hostnames\nlet exchangeServers = W3CIISLog\n| where csUriStem has_any(\"/owa/\",\"/ews/\",\"/ecp/\",\"/autodiscover/\")\n// Only where successful, rule out failed scanning\n| where scStatus startswith \"2\"\n| summarize by Computer;\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where DeviceName in~ (exchangeServers)\n// Where the IIS worker process initiated CMD or PowerShell\n| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == \"w3wp.exe\"\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\")\n// Where CMD or PowerShell command line included parameters associated with CVE-2022-41040/CVE-2022-41082 exploitation\n| where ProcessCommandLine has_any(suspiciousCmdLineKeywords)\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName\n| extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, \"\\\\\", AccountName)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Execution"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1059"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.1.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}