GitLab - User Impersonation

let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');
let impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');
impersonationStart
| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID 
| where EventTime1 > EventTime
| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName
| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName 
| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime

description: |
  'This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or repository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation.'
triggerThreshold: 0
kind: Scheduled
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - Syslog
  connectorId: SyslogAma
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: IPStart
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: IPStop
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: EntityName
    identifier: FullName
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: TargetDetails
    identifier: FullName
  entityType: Account
query: |
  let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit
  | where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');
  let impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit
  | where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');
  impersonationStart
  | join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID 
  | where EventTime1 > EventTime
  | extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName
  | join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName 
  | where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime
version: 1.0.2
tactics:
- Persistence
severity: Medium
queryPeriod: 1d
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic%20Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml
name: GitLab - User Impersonation
triggerOperator: gt
id: 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40
status: Available
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
queryFrequency: 1h

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or repository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation.'\n",
        "displayName": "GitLab - User Impersonation",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "IPStart",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "IPStop",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "EntityName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "TargetDetails",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic%20Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml",
        "query": "let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit\n| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');\nlet impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit\n| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');\nimpersonationStart\n| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID \n| where EventTime1 > EventTime\n| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName\n| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName \n| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Persistence"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}